Presented at:
- 5th Annual philosophy of Emotion Workshop (2026)
- Pacific APA (2025)

*Please email for most recent draft*

Abstract:
A widespread belief pervades philosophical theories of grief:

Moving on is Good (MOG)

Grievers do well to (and should) eventually overcome, or move on from, their grief

This belief is oftentimes implicitly assumed rather than explicitly argued for. Through subjecting it to scrutiny, I show that it is far less plausible than it may initially appear to be and, more importantly, that its acceptance has led grief-theorists astray. In particular, significant philosophical attention has recently been paid to some apparently unresolvable puzzles surrounding (i) our attitudes towards the anticipated diminution or cessation of grief and (ii) the diachronic rationality and fittingness of our emotional responses to loss[1]. I argue that these puzzles arise from an underlying commitment to MOG, which, in turn, rests on a problematic conception of grief as a predominantly backwards-looking process that turns the griever’s attention away from the present. In contrast, the picture of grief I develop articulates how continued (even endless) grief can contribute to living a flourishing life in the present.

Kelley, A. E., & Blumenthal-Barby, J. (2025). Digital Doppelgängers, Grief Bots, and Transformational Challenges. The American Journal of Bioethics, 25(2), 1–2. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2025.2450978

Kelley, A. E. (2024). The Looping Effects of Medicalizing Grief. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 56(167), 101–126.

Abstract:
This paper intervenes on recent debates about whether to include Prolonged Grief Disorder (PGD) as a diagnostic category in the DSM. Often when thinking about institutionalized social categories we tend to focus on negative looping effects – ways that classificatory processes like medicalization (treating something as a disorder) contribute to harmful social practices or distortions of self-conception. I call attention to beneficial looping effects that might be achieved by medicalizing (some) experiences of grief, which would in turn provide heavyweight reasons in favor of medicalization that have been overlooked in recent discussions. In arguing for this, I highlight the often-underappreciated role that medical institutions play in providing tools for self-understanding and fruitful engagement, as opposed to being (just) tools for treatment and recovery.

Accessible here

My dissertation, “Grief, Health, and Medicalization” articulates the role that grief plays in human health and flourishing. Along the way, I develop an account of grief as a constructive process that opens up new possibilities for living in ways that are responsive to value. I also contribute to debates about the recent controversial addition of Prolonged Grief Disorder (PGD) to the DSM.

Journal of Medical Ethics (2023)
Accessible here

It has been suggested that if considerations of autonomy and beneficence support deference to patients’ risk attitudes in medical decision-making, this deference should include the risk attitudes that individuals desire to have or reflectively endorse (Makins N. Patients, doctors and risk attitudes. J Med Ethics 2023;49:737–41.) I draw out a relevant and overlooked distinction between:

(1) deferring to patients’ higher-order attitudes that endorse the first-order risk-attitudes they currently hold

and

(2) deferring to patients’ higher-order attitudes that endorse risk attitudes that are at odds with the first-order risk attitudes they currently hold (which equates to a higher-order desire to change one’s first-order risk-attitudes).

Deferring to a patient’s higher-order desire to possess first-order risk attitudes other than those she in fact possesses is not equivalent to deferring to her endorsement of attitudes she already possesses. Though both instances of deference involve treating her as the person she aspires to be, only the first instance is responsive to the person she actually is. Failing to be thus responsive is problematic because autonomy requires assisting a patient to direct her life in accordance with her higher-order values—not treating her as if she already is the person she aspires to be. Deferring to the attitudes that an individual would like to, but does not in fact, hold, thus risks undermining her autonomy.

An empirical study conducted as part of my work with Michigan Medicine and the Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine and presented at ASBH 2024.
Slides available upon request